Investment incentives in endogenously growing economies by Restoy Lozano, Fernando & Rockinger, Georg Michael
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN ENDOGENOUSLY
GROWING ECONOMIES
Fernando Restoy and Georg Michael Rockinger
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
SERVICIO DE ESTUDIOS
Documento de Trabajo nº 9208
BANCO DE ESPANA 
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN ENDOGENOUSLY 
GROWING ECONOMIES 
Fernando Restoy and Georg Michael Rockinger (*) 
(.) Bank of Spain and Harvard University. We are grateful to Gary Chamberlain, Dale Jorgenson, Greg 
Mankiw and Philippe Weil for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. We also thank Jennifer Hunt, 
Michael Munson, and James Thomson for valuable suggestions. Restoy is thankful for financia1 support 
from Spain 'g Ministry of Education. 
SERVICIO DE ESTUDIOS 
Documento de Trabajo nQ 9208 
In publishing this series the Bank of Spain seeks to disseminate 
studies of interest that will help acquaint readers better 
with the Spanish economy. 
The analyses, opinions and findings of these papers represent 
the views of their authors; they are not necessarily those 
of the Bank of Spain. 
ISBN: 84-7793-147-X 
Dep6sito legal: M-6250-l992 
Imprenta del Banco de Espana 
Abstract 
In this paper, we present and simulate a stochastic endogenous growth model with ad­
justment costs. We show that the inclusion of adjustment costs in a stochastic framework 
constitutes a relevant generalization of the existing endogenous growth models for, at least, 
two reasons: First, the presence of moderate to small adjustment costs is relevant to explain­
ing the growth rate of the economy. Second, it allows us to relate growth with asset prices in 
a general equilibrium endogenous growth generalization of the Q-theory of investment. The 
model is used to analyze the incidence of changes in the corporate tax rate and the investment 
tax credit. We show that adjustment costs significantly moderate the effects of distorting taxes 
on the economy's growth rate. However, the responsiveness of the growth rate to changes of 
taxation significantly increases the influence of the corporate tax rate on a firm's market value 
per unit of capital and reduces the effect of the investment tax credit. This result in conjunc­
tion with the tax-effects on the growth rate of firm's value challenges the traditional analysis 
of the long-run effect of taxes on the market price of firms in models with exogenous growth. 
KEYWORDS: Endogenous growth, Q-Theory, tax�tion, asset pricing. 

1 Introduction 
Recently, there has been an emergence of models of economic growth which are able to expla.in 
the long-run growth rate of an economy as the result of .the optimizing beha.vior of agents in a. 
particular technological and institutional environment. Those endogenous growth models [e.g., 
Romer (1986, 1989), Lucas (1988), Barro and Becker (1989), and Rebelo (1991)J have challenged 
the traditional neoclassical models where long-run growth is essentially an exogenous phenomenon 
related to the growth rate of the population or some predetermined form of technical change. An 
interesting issue to address within this new framework is the role of government intervention in 
economic development and, more specifically, the effect of distorting taxes on the growth rate of 
the economy. This question has been initially addressed by Rebelo (1991) and Barro (1990). 
So far the endogenous growth literature has not dealt with adjustment costs of investment. 
There are strong reasons to believe that adjustment costs are an important element in the deter· 
mination of the growth rate of the economy and the analysis of the effects of distorting taxation. 
They characterize the relative price of installed capital with respect to the consumption good and, 
therefore, modify the opportunity cost of investment. On the other hand, distorting taxes and 
credits will affect the contribution of adjustment costs to tha.t opportunity cost. For example, the 
corporate income tax affects the relative price of installed capital through the tax deductibility of 
adjustment costs and an investment tax credit reduces the acquisition price of new capital goods 
rela.tive to tha.t of the already installed capital. 
The endogeneity of the growth rate of the capital stock has strong implications for the analysis 
of tax effects on asset prices. The value of a firm in equilibrium is a discounted sum of future 
expected cash flows. In principle, those after-tax cash flows are affected not only by changes 
in the tax-rates but also by changes in the optimal investment-dividend policy. The tra.d..itional 
neoclassical Q models [e.g., Abel (1982), Summers (1982), Salinger and Summers (1983), Goulder 
and Summers (1986), as well as Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)] obtain long· run growth rates of 
the capital stock that are independent of the tax-code. Therefore, taxes do not affect the pre-tax 
value of future expected cash-flows since the investment policy does not change with modifications 
of taxes Qr credits. The evaluation of changes on the market valuation of a firm's capital stock 
is different in models where the investment policy, and therefore the growth rate of the economy 
-!)-
is endogenously determined. Changes in taxes modify the optimal investment policy and this 
effect adds on to the direct effect on after-tax cash flows. Furthermore, since the change in the 
tax-incentive scheme affects the growth rate of a firm's capital stock, it also affects the growth 
rate of the market value of that capital stock. This dynamic effect is also absent in the exogenous 
growth models. 
In this paper we develop a general equilibrium endogenous growth model which incorporates 
adjustment costs and use it to analyze tax effects on economic growth and on market prices of 
the productive units. We obtain the endogenous growth feature by introducing the Arrow-Romer 
externality effect into the model. Technical change is a public good related to the aggregate capital 
stock, but perceived as exogenous by individuals. However, our model incorporates uncertainty 
by adding random shocks to the endogenous technical shock. This approach is in the spirit of 
the King-Plosser-Rebelo (1988) attempt to relate the real business cycle and the endogenous 
growth literatures. More modestly, the uncertainty element provides realism to our description 
of the relation between optimal investment decisions and asset prices. In addition, the empirical 
distribution of the technical shock obtained from the data provides confidence intervals for the 
tax-incidence simulation exercises we perform to evaluate the model. The model provides a one 
to one relation between the investment-capital ratio and the market value of the firm per unit 
of capital that constitutes a general equilibrium stochastic endogenous growth version of the 
Q-theory of investment. 
We show that adjustment costs significantly moderate the effects of distorting taxes on the 
economy's growth rate. However, the responsiveness of the growth rate to cbanges in taxation 
significantly increases the influence of the corporate tax rate on-a firm's market value per unit of 
capital and reduces the effect of the investment tax credit. This result in conjunction with the 
tax-effects on the growth rate of firm's value challenges the traditional analysis of the long-run 
effect of taxes on the market price of firms in models with exogenous growth. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple one-input, determinisiic, 
constant returns to scale model. This simple model yields approximate closed. form solutions 
which are used to illustrate the role of adjustment costs in the analysis of the effects of distorting 
taxation on growth. Section 3 generalizes the economy by introducing labor, technical change, 
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and uncertainty. We then show how the model can be solved using standard numerical techniques. 
Se<:tion 4 establishes a relation between the optimal investment policies and the market valuation 
of the firm. Next we analyze the differences between the neoclassical and the endogenous growth 
approaches to tax-incidence, and relate the firm's value with the consumer's welfare. Section 5 
performs calibration of the model focusing on the evaluation of the equilibrium growth rates for 
different combinations of preference and technological parameters. Section 6 analyzes different 
tax-incidence exercises. Section 7 concludes. 
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2 Taxes in a Simple Endogenous Growth Model with Adjust-
ment Costs 
In this section we present a. stylized deterministic model which introduces adjustment costs and 
distorting taxes in an endogenous growth model with a single input technology. A sufficiently 
simple technology is chosen so that we can obtain an approximate closed form solution for the 
growth ra.te of the economy. The model is particularly useful for understa.nding the effects of 
taxes on the growth rate of economies with adjustment costs. 
2.1 The Economy 
Assume a discrete timel, infinitely-lived, representative agent economy. The agent receives utility 
from the consumption of a single stora.ble good. The utility function is time additive. A single 
input technology allows the agent to transfer the consumption good over time. Technology consists 
of a production function, an adjustment cost function, and a capital accumulation rule. The 
production function relates units of output to a single input (capital). The adjustment cost 
function expresses the loss of output per unit of investment due to installation or adjustment 
of capital, and is a function of the investment·capital ratio. Finally, the capital accumulation 
rule establishes the relation between the stock of capital and the investment expenditure. For 
simplicity, we assume in this section that there is no depreciation of the capital stock. 
There exists an exogenous tax system which subtracts resources from the economy in an 
irreversible fashion2• The tax system is composed of a. capital income tax and an investment tax 
credit. 
The optimization problem of the representative agent at period t can be characterized by the 
dynamic program 
max {fp·u(c,+.)} 
{It} &=0 
(1) 
I, 
s.t. C, = (1 - u)Y, - (1- k + (1 - u)¢( K, »I, (2) 
1The growth litera.ture tends to prefer to sd models in continuous ra.ther than in discrete time. The discrete 
time assumption is used here to facilitate the inclusion of uncertainty in the next section. 
"l An alternative is to Usume that the government budget is balanced and the utility function ia separable in 
consumption and government expenditures. 
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Yo = F(K,) (3) 
(4) 
where Y, C, K, and I denote output, consumption, net capital stock, and gross investment. u 
and k are the capital income tax rate and the investment tax credit per unit of investment. The 
utility function U(C�) is assumed to have the isoelastic form U(C1) = Ci-'l'/(l-1') where "'I is 
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. ¢(-) is the adjustment cost function. 
This function is multiplied by (1 - u) to reflect the tax-deductibility of installation expenses. We 
assume in this section tha.t the adjustment cost function has the linear form ¢( i) = 8i/2 where i 
(== 1/ K) is the investment-capital ratio. 
The single-input production function is assumed to have the standard constant returns to 
scale form: F(Kt} = )"Kt where)" is a constant. 
2.2 The Equilibrium Growth Rate 
The first order conditions of the optimization program (1)-(4) are 
),(1- u) + (1 - u)0;1t,/2 + 1 - k + (1 - u)O;,t, 
1- k + (1- u)O;, 
.!. ((1 - u», - (1 - k + (1 - u)Oi,tl/2)i,t1 (1 + .,»)
' 
f3 (1 - u», - (1- k + (1- u)0'./2);, (5) 
Notice that the right hand side of (5) represents the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution 
expressed in terms of the investment-capital ratio. The term in the denominator on the left hand 
side of (5) is the after tax cost of buying and installing one unit of capital at period t. The 
numerator on the left hand side is the payoff at period t + 1 from investing one unit at period t. 
To see this, notice that 'x(l- u)+ (1- u)9i�+t/2 expresses the after tax increase in the resources 
available for consumption at period t + 1 when one marginal unit of the consumption good has 
been invested at period t. Sirnila.rly, 1- k + (1-u)9it+t is the price of one unit of installed capital 
at period t + 1. Thus, equation (5) states that, in equilibrium, the return on investing one unit 
of the consumption good must be equal to some required rate of return equal to the inverse of 
the marginal rate of substitution. 
Equation (5) is a. difference equation in the investment-capital ratio that admits a steady state 
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solution under some regularity conditions3. That solution has to satisfy 
1 >.(1- u) + (1- u)8.'/2 _ (I + .p + 1 k + (I u)8. - fJ 
Performing a linear approximation of both sides of (6) around i = 0 we get 
>'(1 - u) >'(1 - u)'8. . 
(I-k) - (\-k)' =p + (l +ph" 
where p is defined as the time preference parameter (Le., l/P = 1 + pl. 
(6) 
(7) 
To analyze expression (7), notice that the term >.(1- u)/(l- k) is the effective productivity 
of one marginal unit of the consumption good invested in expanding the capital stock. Simi-
larly, 8i(1- 1£)/(1- k) is the effective increase of adjustment costs due to the investment of one 
marginal unit of the consu�ption good. Therefore, the rate of return on investment is approxi­
mately the effective marginal productivity of capital minus the effective marginal loss on output 
due to adjustment costs. The right hand side is the required rate of return on savings which 
depends positively on the rate of discount of future utility (p) and negatively on the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution (117). 
Solving (7) for the equilibrium investment-capital ratio we find 
. >,� - p  
• 
= 
1(\ +p) + >'(�)'8' 
(8) 
Since there is no depreciation of the capital stock, equation (8) is an expression for the 
(endogenously determined) growth rate of this economy. This growth rate depends positively on 
the effective marginal productivity of capital and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and 
negatively on the time preference rate and the magnitude of the adjustment costs for investment. 
In the absence of adjustment costs (8 = 0) and taxes (u = k = 0), equation (8) collapses to an 
expression very similar to the Barro (1990}Rebelo (1991) formula for the instantaneous optimal 
3In particular, we require the following tn.nsversality condition to hold 
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growth rate of a continuous time-constant returns to scale economy without adjustment costs4. 
In general, the presence of adjustment costs reduces the equilibrium growth rate of the economy 
by a significant magnitude. To see this, divide the numerator and denominator of (8) by ,(1 + p) 
and define the growth rate in absence of adjustment costs as 'I. Then 
= 
where 
= 
1 + 8t=I(i+ .,(l-+pj), 
�t=r - p 
1(1+ P)' 
(9) 
Take, for example, ; = 4%, 9(1- .)/(1- k) = 2.5, 1 = 1, and p = 5%; we find i = 3.2%. Thus, 
the presence of adjustment costs, which represent approximately 5% of total after tax investment 
expenses, implies a growth rate which is 22% lower than the one obtained in the absence of 
adjustment costs. From equation (9), the importance of adjustment costs would be larger (lower) 
for higher (lower) elasticities of intertemporal substitution (1/,) and higher (lower) values of the 
time preference parameter (p). 
2.3 Tax Incidence on Growth 
In this economy without depreciation allowances, the distorting effect of the tax system is perfectly 
summarized by the ratio T = (1- u)/(l- k). The effect of changes in T on the growth rate of 
the economy is given by 
di ,\ [1(1 + p) - 9r('\r - 2p)] 
dr 11(1 + p) + 9r',\J' 
(10) 
Changes in T have ambiguous implications if adjustment costs are positive. The reason is that 
an increase in 1" has two opposite effects. On one hand, it increases the after tax value of the 
marginal productivity of capital, providing incentives to invest. On the other hand, it reduces the 
tax-deductibility of adjustment costs and increases the total amount of those costs by increasing 
TA. 
4The·exa.ct formula. is i = 7. This expression could have been obtained by impoliing 9 = 0 in (6) and 
linearizing the log of the left hand side around)" = 0 and the log of the right hand side around i = 0 and p = O. 
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From equation (10), the prevailing effect on growth of an increase in T depends upon the rela­
tion between 'Y and the aiter tax value of the adjustment costs 8T2 A. Notice that, in equation (7), 
a higher investment-capital ratio lowers the left hand side through an increase in the adjustment 
costs and raises the right hand side through an increase in the required rate of return. If 'Y is 
high in relation to 8, the increase in the aiter tax productivity of capital requires an increase in 
the investment-capital ratio to restore the equilibrium through an increase in the required rate 
of return on savings. Conversely, if 'Y is low in relation to 8, the increase in C increases the 
adjustment costs more than the required rate of return. The equilibrium condition then requires 
a lowering of the adjustment costs by decreasing the equilibrium value of the investment-capital 
ratio. Thus, in this endogenous growth model with adjustment costs, the interest elasticity of 
savings must not be too small if investment incentive policies a.re not to have perverse effects. 
3 A More General Model 
The stylized model of the previous section has several limita.tions. First, it considers a single 
input technology. With more inputs the marginal productivity of capital will be constant only 
for increasing returns to scale technologies. This crea.tes problems in guaranteeing existence of a. 
competitive equilibrium allocation. Second, the model does not include the physical depreciation 
of the capital stock in the capital accumula.tion rule and the tax code. Third, there is no element 
of uncertainty in the return of investment. This element prevents a realistic description of the 
prices that support a competitive equilibrium alloca.tion. In particular, the relation between 
investment decisions and the market value of the technology cannot be satisfactorily modeled in 
this set up. In this section we will extend the basic model to accommoda.te those features. 
3.1 The Stochastic Economy 
The economy is now composed of many identical, infinitely-lived households that receive u�ility 
from the consumption of a single storable good. Each agent owns a single technology which 
is subject to uncertain technical shocks, and the agent maximizes his expected lifetime utility 
subject to the available resources. 
Technology is represented, as before, by a. production function, an adjustment cost function, 
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and a capital accumulation rule. Instead of the previous single input technology, we now assume 
that the production function relates output with capital and inelastically supplied labor, and 
incorporates a random technical change, the only element of uncertainty in this economy. As 
before, the adjustment cost function is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to investment 
and capital. Finally, the capital accumulation rule incorporates exponential depreciation of the 
capital stock. 
The tax system contains as in section 2 a capital income tax, and an investment tax credit, 
but it also includes allowances for depreciation of the capital stock. 
The optimization problem of a representative agent in this stochastic economy can be char-
acterized by the dynamic program 
maxE, {�/i'U(C<+.)} (11) 
s.t. 
I, C, = (1 - u)Y, - (1- k + (1- u)q\( K, ))1,+ uDA, 
(12) 
Y, = F(K" L"w,) (13) 
(14) 
where 6 and Wt are respectively the depreciation rate and the random technical change variable. 
DAt is the depreciation allowance for the capital stock .at period t. For simplicity, we assume 
that depreciation allowances follow replacement rather than acquisition price criteria. Therefore 
DAt :;;; 6T Kt where 6T is the depreciation rate for tax purposess. 
We will assume from now on that the production function has the Cobb-Douglas form 
(15) 
where the inelastically supplied labor has been normalized to unity. 
$The introduction of acquisition price bued depreciation could be modelled by assuming DA, = ES d(.)II_. 
where S is the depreci�tion horizon and d(.) ia the depreciAtion a.llowance for .,-yeu old equipment. H;�ver thi. 
asaumption introduce. substantial uo'�tional and computAtional difficulties without altering the theoretical and 
empirical conclusions of this p�per. 
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3.2 Technical Change 
In order to completely characterize the economy, we need to specify the distribution of the techno­
logical variable WI. If w, = 1 the model is very similar to the one suggested by Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987) to analyze effects of the 1986 tax reform on investment. This model, in the 
neoclassical tra.d..ition, assumes decreasing marginal productivity of capital: FK(K, 1,1) = aKo-l. 
Therefore, the economy is constrained to have a. predetermined growth rate in the long run 
as the capital stock approaches a steady state level. This exogeneity of the long run rate of 
growth remains essentia.lly unaltered jf w, follows a prespecified deterministic or stochastic process 
expressing some form of exogenous technical change as in the Real Business Cy cle literature (See 
King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988)). 
The endogenous growth approach requires Wt to be an offsetting force to the decline in the 
aggregate marginal productivity of capital as the capital stock grows. Then, technical change 
has to depend positively on the aggregate capital stock. If the production function is linear 
homogenous in capital and labor for given WI! technical change creates increasing returns to scale. 
In order to make increasing returns to scale of the aggregate production technology compatible 
with the existence of a competitive equilibrium, we follow the Arrow·Romer approach and assume 
that the effects of technical change a.re external from individuals' investment decisions. Technical 
progress is related to the aggregate capital stock but is perceived as exogenous by individua.J 
agents. Calling k the aggregate (per capita) capital stock, technical change is defined by 
(16) 
where At is a stationary exogenous random va.riable. Therefore. the production function (15) can 
be written as 
(17) 
From equation (17) it is clear that the external effect expressed in equation (16) establishes a 
wedge between the private marginal productivity d capital and the social one. The former is 
FK(Kto 1, kl-o At/a) = AtK:-t k/-o and the latter is *,. Thus, individual agents do not inter· 
- 14 -
nalize all the social benefits associated with their investment decisions. This source of inefficiency 
of the competitive equilibrium allocation adds to the one created by the presence of distorting 
taxes. 
The introduction of a stochastic term in the Arrow·Romer relation (16) reflects the existence of 
short·lived shocks to the marginal productivity of capital. This element will allow us to calibrate 
the model in a. relatively precise way, and to· provide confidence intervals in the tax·incidence 
exercises. In addition, it permits us to deal realistically with the market valuation of technology 
(a risky asset pricing problem). 
3.3 Equilibrium Investment Policies 
The inefficiency of the competitive allocation prevents us from using Bellman equation s�lution 
techniques to obtain the equilibrium investment policies. This procedure requires Pareto opti· 
mality of the competitive equilibrium allocation. (See Stockey and Lucas (1989).) Instead, we 
are compelled to impose the market clearing equilibrium conditions over the first order conditions 
of the agent's optimization problem. 
Using standard dynamic progra.mming techniques and elementary algebra, one can express 
the first order conditions of the maximization problem in the following Euler equation form: 
(18) 
wheYe C, satisfies (12), (13), and 
R{(Kt+1,W'+l, il+1, it) = [FK(Kt+1,I,Wt+1)(I- u) + u6T + 
�'(i<+,)ii+1 + (1- 0)(1- k + �'(i,+,)i<+, + 4>(i<+I))1 / [1- k + 4>'(i,)i, + 4>(i,)J, (19) 
where 4>(.) = (1- u)<P(.). 
The deno�nator in (19) is the after·tax cost of buying and installing one unit of capital 
at period t. On the other hand, from equation (12), the first three terms in the numerator 
express the after�tax increase in the resources available for consumption at period t + 1 due to the 
investment of one marginal unit of the consumption good. Therefore, R[(t + 1) is the return, net 
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of depreciation and adjustment costs, on investing one unit of the consumption good in expanding 
the capital stock of the firm. Hence, equation (18) constitutes a set of equilibrium conditions for 
the return on real investment analogous to the standard arbitrage conditions for the returns on 
financial claims used in the asset pricing literature6. 
Using equations (12) and (17), and assuming an isoelastic utility function, the intertemporal 
marginal rate of substitution can be written as 
pU'(C '+l) f3 (C
C
'+
, 
,) -" 
U'(C,) 
where 
Investment returns have the form 
R{ (K!H. K/H• itH• it.AtH); 
Kf+ll kl.+t At+l + u6T + Il>'( it+l)i�+l + (1 - 6)(1 - k + �I( it+l )it+l + Il>( it+1)) 
1 k + <1>'( i,Jid <1>( i,) 
(20) 
(22) 
Now, imposing the general equilibrium condition Kt = Kt on (21) and (22), we find that the 
equilibrium value of the marginal rate of substitution and the investment return are both inde-
pendent of the capital stock in levels, depending only on the investment-capital ratio i and the 
sta.tionary exogenous random variable A, for given technological and tax parameters. From the 
externality assumption, in equilibrium, the private average and marginal productivity of capital 
are respectively )"t/a and )"t. Therefore, the productivity of capital does not depend on the level 
of the capital stock as it does in the standard neoclassical models. Since adjustment costs and 
the capital growth rate only depend on the investment-capital ratio, according to (21) and (22), 
consumption growth (and therefore, the marginal rate of substitution) and the investment return 
at period t+ 1 are completely characterized by if! it+l,)"t and )"t+1. Consequently, imposing the 
general equilibrium condition Kt ; Kt on (19) y ields the following stochastic difference equation 
��h� asset pricing implications of that condition have been derived and empirically exploited in a partial 
equilibnum framework by Cochrane (1991), Braun (1990) and Restoy and Rockinger (1991). 
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for the equilibrium investment-capital ra.tio 
E, {i1{ (1 - u»,,+1/o. + u6T - (1 -k + �(iHI))i'H }-' 
{(I - u)A1+l + u6T + (l/( it+di�+l + (1 - 6)(1 -k + (l/( il+diH1 + fJ(it+t)} } 
= 
{(1-u)A,(1- u)!� � :�i� (1- k + �(i'»i' } -, {1- k + �'(i,)i, + �(i,)). 
This expression is the stochastic counterpart of equation (5) for economies subject to constant 
aggregate marginal productivity of capital. 
Assume now that AI follows a m-state homogeneous Markov process with transition proba­
bilities {7!'r"}�":::l' Then, by expression (18), any stationary investment policy must satisfy the 
system of equations 
m 
H(A"i,) = l:�"G(A.,i.) r,s;: 1,···,m, (23) 
where 
H(A"i,) 
a.nd 
G(A"i,) = i1{(1-u)A,!a+u6T -(1-k+�(i,»i,r' 
{{I -u)A, + u6T + �'(i, )i; + (1-6)(1- k+ �'(i,)i, + �(i,»)). 
Then, the optimal investment policy and therefore the growth rate of the economy (i- 6) are 
completely characterized by the realization of the stationary technical shock A. 
To ensure that the system (23) has a solution, we require the following 
[A.I] There exists a constant g < +00 s.t. tP(i) � 0, </I(i) � 0 and </I'(i) � 0 for all i � g. 
[A.2] H(A"g) � E:'., �"G(.\ .. g). 
The fir'st assumption just requires the positiveness, monotonicity and convexity of the ad-
justment cost function for an economically mea.ningful set of values of the investment-capital 
ratio. The second assumption establishes a lower bound for the expected risk adjusted return on 
investment in that set. 
-17 -
PROPOSITION 1: If the vector>' = p,. }�1' the matrix 11 = {1!"".}�.=1 a.nd the function 
¢>(.) axe such that assumptions [A. I] a.nd [A.2] hold, then there exists a vector i = {i"}::"=l with 
i ;::: 9 that is a solution of the system (23). 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
This proposition shows that the equilibrium investment-capital ratio is a variable that follows 
a time homogenous Markov process which is the solution of a system of nonlinear equations. 
Unfortunately this system does not admit closed·form solutions, unlike the simple deterministic 
model presented in the second section. The model is solved numerically in Section 6. 
4 Value of the Firm, Contingent Claim Prices, and Consumer 
Welfare 
So far we have formulated the model in terms of the maximization problem of consumers who 
own the capital stock of the economy. This approach has been useful in solving for the equilib· 
rium investment policies. Analogously we ca.n obtain the competititive equilibrium allocation by 
further decentralizing the model a.nd considering identical price taking value maximizing firms 
and expected utility maximizing consumers in a complete markets framework. This approach 
will allow us to rela.te the equilibrium investment policies with the market value of the firm, 
consumer's welfare, and to obtain a wider picture of the effects of taxation in this economy. 
4.1 Competitive Firm's Problem 
Assume there exists a. sufficient number of long-lived securities to dynamically complete the 
markets (in the sense of Duffie and Hua.ng (1985)). Denote by F, the information set at period, 
t and by at a typical element of Ft. Now call Do.l the firm's cash flows in state at and pt(a,) 
the price at period t of one unit of consumpt�on in state a. at period s. Given a complete 
set of contingent claim prices, the firm's problem consists of obtaining the life-time investment 
schedule that maximizes total cash flows evaluated at the contingent claim prices subject to the 
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technological constraints. The maximization problem of the firm can be written as 
V(K .. A,) _ (24) 
+� 
L L p,(a.H(1 - u)[Y •• - X •• L •• 1 - (1 - k + �(i •• ))I •• + u6T K.) .=1+1 G#EF. 
s.t. Y •• F(K.,LG.,wG.) = K:L!;owG� (25) 
KoHl (1- 6)K. + I." 
where X, is the wage rate. 
(26) 
(27) 
In the problem (24)-(27) uncertainty plays no role as long as the relative prices of the single 
good in the different states of nature are known ez ante to the firm. 
The solution to the program will give the firm's optimal investment and labor demand in each 
state as a function of the set of contingent claim prices and the wage ra.te. Tha.t solution has to 
satisfy the set of first order conditions 
x •. 
and 
where 
and 
FL •• = (1- a)(Y • .!L •• ) (2 8) 
L p,(a<+I)R{(a,+I) = 1, (29) 
G.+l 
Rf(llt+1) = [i'K(llt+l) + u6T + itl(iG'+I)i�'+l + 
(1- 6)(1- k + t'(i ••• , )i ••• , + W(i .... ))]I [1- k + w'(i,)i, + W(i,)] (30) 
Notice that (29) is a. restatement of the arbitr3{;e equation (18) in terms of contingent claim prices 
instead of preferences. In a. world of complete markets, the return of all investment strategies 
evaluated at tJle contingent claim prices have to be equal to prevent arbitr3{;e opportunities. 
In order to obtain an expression for the value of the firm, impose the equilibrium conditions 
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Lt :; 1 and Kt :; X, in the investment equation (30). Then FK(a,+d :; (1 - U)A41+1 and the 
equilibrium investment-capital ratio depends only on the variable A for given contingent prices. 
Furthermore, the equilibrium value of the aggregate profits of the firm in state a, in period s is 
D •• = (1- .)[Y •• - X •• l- (1 - k + �(i" •• ))I:. + .6T K, = 
K,[(I - .) ... . - (1-k + �(i;.))i;. + .6TI, 
where. refers to equilibrium values. 
(31) 
Now, define the after tax net value of the firm as the sum of future cash flows evaluated at 
the contingent prices minus the cost of initial investment. Then, along the optimal investment 
path, this variable satisfies the recursive expression 
J(K" ... ,) = - (I -k + �(in )ij K, + L PI( "HI){ ....... (I - .) + J(K'+I, ... ... )), (32) 
4'+IEF'+1 
where J(.,') is the after tax net value function. Since the equilibrium investment-capital ratio 
is a function of the technical shock variable, and AI follows a Markov process, we can write the 
equilibrium investment-capital ratio as ii :; i(>",), A natural guess for the functional form of the 
net value function is J(Kh At) = ip(At)K,. Using the first order conditions (28)-(29) we obtain a 
first order stochastic difference equa.tion for lP(At) with solution 
"'(i("',)) = �'(i( ... ,))i("',)' + (1- 6)([1-k + �'('("',))li("',) + �(i("'.))) . (33) 
The ex-dividend market value of the firm at period t, Vi, is simply the net value plus the investment 
expenses a.t period t. Thus 
V(K" ... ,) = J(K" ... ,) + (1 -k + �(,( ... ,)))i("',)) K, 
(1- 6 + i( ... ,)) [(1-k + �'(;( ... ,))i("',) + 41(,("',))) K, 
= Q( ... ,)K,+" (34) 
where 
Q("") = (1-k + <1>'(;("',));(", ) + <1>(;("',)). (35) 
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This expression states that in an economy with a linear homogeneous adjustment cost function, 
constant private returns to scale and increasing aggregate returns to scale, the market value of 
the firm is proportional to the repla.cement cost of its capital stock. The fa.ctor of proportionality 
just depends on the realization of the stochastic marginal productivity of capital for given tax. 
and technological parameters. Therefore, as in the neoclassical deterministic model of Hayashi 
(1982), marginal Q is equal to average Q. Furthen:nore, assuming linear adjustment costs per unit 
of investment (ct(i) = (1- u)8i/2), we obtain the popular linear relation between Q(�t) and the 
investment-capital ratio 
Q(A,) = 1 - k + 0(1- u)i(A,). (36) 
Therefore, the model we have presented, with endogenous growth, uncertainty and risk aversion, 
provides a relation between the investment-capital ra.tio and the market value of the firm per unit 
of ca.pital similar to the standard Q model. In this general equilibrium set-up, the endogeneity 
of both investment and the firm's value becomes apparent since both variables are simultane-
ous1y determined by the .realization of the technical shock (�t). This simultaneity is one of the 
econometric difficulties in estima.tin g varia.nts of equation (36). 
In the tax. incidence analysis, the endogeneity of the growth rate of the economy establishes 
serious differences with respect to the neoclassical Q models [e.g., Able (1982), Summers (1982), 
Salinger and Summers (1983), Goulder and Summers (1983), and Auerbach and Kotlikoff(1988)J. 
In standard Q models, the economy grows in the long-run at a rate which is independent of 
individuals' decisions. Therefore the investment-capital ratio is fixed. The exogeneity of the 
growth rate has two implications in the tax incidence analysis. First, according to Q-tbeory 
(summarized in expressions (35}(36)), the value of the firm grows at the same prespecified rate 
as capital, regardless of changes in the tax-code. Second, in the long-run, taxes only affect 
value through their direct effects on the relative price of installed capital. In our model, the 
equilibrium investment-capital ra.tios are affected by changes in taxes. Since Q is a stationary 
variable, changes in tax rates tha.t affect the equilibrium growth rate of capital affect the growth 
ra.te of the firm's value in the same amount. In addition to tha.t, from equation (35), those 
changes in the equilibrium investment-capital ratio affect the equilibrium stationary value of Q 
I 
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in conjunction with the direct effect produced by the changes in taxation. 
In order to get a better understanding of the difference between the two approaches, consider a 
cbange in the investment tax credit. The value of the firm per unit of installed capital is decreasing 
with the investment tax credit for given investment-capital ratios since a higher investment tax 
credit lowers the relative price of installed capital with respect to consumption. This effect 
is the only one considered in the neoclassical analysis of the long-run incidence of changes in 
the investment tax-credit on the market valuation of the firm. However, an increase in k will 
affect positively the equilibrium investment-capital ratio for reasonable parameter values7• From 
equations (35) and (36), this change in the investment policy will offset the direct neoclassical 
effect of the change in k by an amount that depends positively on the size of the adjustment 
costs. Furthermore, the increase in the investment-capital ratio will imply an increase in the 
growth rate of the value of the firm. As a consequence, a decrease in the equilibrium value for Q 
when k rises implies a short term market devaluation for the firm that eventually disappears as 
a consequence of the higher rates of growth. 
On the other band, an increase in the corpora� tax rate affects the value of the firm through 
the decrease in the tax deductibility of adjustment costs (�(.)::;: (1- u)q)(·)) as in the standard 
model, but also through the modification of the equilibrium investment-capital ratio. Thus, if 
the latter is negative, the total effect is unambiguously larger than the one obtained under the 
standard Q approach. 
The rest of the technological and tax-parameters, and the contingent claim prices, only affect 
the value of the firm through their influence on the determination of the optimal investment­
capital ratio. An increase in the contingent claim prices for future consumption will typically 
increase the equilibrium investment-capital ratio and, therefore, the value of the firm per unit 
of capital. (The future and uncertainty are less heavily discounted.) This effect is absent in the 
neoclassical approach even when the model includes time-varying endogenous discount factors 
(as in Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987))8, as long as the long-run growth rate of the capital stock is 
exogenously determined. 
T k; we saw in section 2, this typically requires that adjWltme.nt costs ue sufficiently small in relation to the 
inverse of the duticity of int.e:rtemporal substitution. 
8Notice from equations (35) and (36) that the Q-rdation is independent of the contingent claim prices for a 
given equilibrium investment-capital ra.tio. 
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4.2 Competitive Consumer's Problem 
Consider now the optimization problem of an infinitely-lived competitive consumer who owns 
a claim on the stock of a representative firm in the economy. The cash flows of that firm are 
represented by the sequence Dr.., a, E F,. In addition, the agent receives from the firm at the 
beginning of period t a wage income equal to Xt• Since markets are complete, a claim on the 
stock of the firm is marketed. Define Rt(at+d, the market return between t and state at+! in 
period t + 1, as 
(37) 
where Vt is the ex-dividend market value of the firm. 
Define as 1I',(a,) the probability of reaching state a, in F, (8 > t), conditional on Ft. Then, the 
optimization problem for the price-taking consumer who maximizes his expected life-time utility 
is 
S.t. 
(38) 
(39) 
Since the labor income (XI) is exogenous to the individual, the first order conditions have the 
form 
(40) 
Notice that expression (40) has an Euler equation form similar to the competitive firm's first 
order conditions (29). Equation (40) is a no arbitrage condition for the market return of the 
firms as equa.tion (29) is a no arbitrage condition for investment returns. It turns out that both 
returns are equal sta.te by state'in this economy with constant private returns to scale and linear 
homogenous adjustment cost function . . 
PROPOSITION 2: Consider a firm whose optimization problem is represented by the program 
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(25) to (27). Then 
(41) 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
This result extends to this economy, with distorting taxes and endogenous growth, the results 
of Cochrane (1990) and Restoy and Roc.kinger (1991) for neoclassical economies without taxes9. 
From proposition 2 and the equilibrium conditions of competitive firms and consumers, we obtain 
that the equilibrium allocation represented by the solution to equation (18) is supported by a 
complete set of contingent claim prices {Pt(a.).s > t,a, E F,} which satisfy 
(42) 
where 
(43) 
The contingent claim prices express the evaluation of the tra.deoff between current and future 
consumption by the economic agents. Since the returns on savings are stochastic, those prices 
involve both the agents' willingness to delay consumption, and their risk aversion. From equations 
(42) and (43) the contingent prices are negatively related to the investment-capital ratio. This 
introduces a factor of stability in the system. Incentives to invest decrease the tradeoff between 
present and future consumption and, therefore, reduce the evaluation of future cash Bows by the 
firm. Consequently, further investment becomes less a.ttractive. 
Finally, we are interested in relating the value of the firms with the consumer's welfare in 
the competitive equilibrium allocation. Denote by W(.\h Kt) the value of the consumer's utility 
function in the competitive equilibrium allocation. We then have 
PROPOSITION 3: Assume that firms solve the optimization problem (24)-(27) and consumers 
8Cochrane (1990) obtains the equivalence betwen market fettunl and investment returns in u economy .nth 
quadratic adjustment costa ud a linea.r production function. Restoy ud Rockinger (1991) show that this reult 
holds in general stochil3tic economies that satisfy the Hayashi (1982) conditions: price-taking #inns ud linear 
homogenous adjustment oo&t and production functions. 
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solve (38)-(39). Then the consumer's indirect utility function in the competitive equilibrium 
allocation is given by 
where 
m(A,) 
and q(A,) 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
(44) 
Not surprisingly, the presence of labor makes it impossible to obtain an analytically closed 
form solution for the indirect utility function. However, the indirect utility function normalized 
by a power of the capital stock is still a stationary variable that follows a Markov distribution 
given our assumption about the distribution of >'t. The value of m(>',) can be easily computed 
numerically up to arbitrary accuracy by taking a sufficient number of terms in the sum under the 
expected value operator. (see Appendix D). 
Expression (44) shows that the rate of growth of welfare is different from the rate of growth 
of the capital stock. In particular, the closer the coefficient of relative risk aversion i is to 1, 
the lower the expected rate of growth of the indirect utility function is in relation to that of the 
capital stock. 
5 Model Calibration 
In this section we solve numericaJ.ly the optimal investment policy problem presented in Section 
3. To do so we need to calibrate the stochastic technical shock variable. We assume that (>'1) 
follows a. lognormal first order autoregressive process whose parameters are estimated using U.S. 
data. Since the model predicts tha.t in equilibrium Y, - XI = aYi = >'tKt we estimate At =:: In(>'t) 
by using data on output (Yi), wages (Xt), and capital (Kt), taking >., equal to (Yi - Xf)/Kt. For 
output we use Gross Domestic Product in private industries. Wages are measured as total labor 
compensation in private industries and capital is defined as fixed private domestic capital plus 
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the stock of inventories10. 
The Markov process for At is obtained by estimating a first order autocorrelated process for 
annual observationsl1 ofln{>.t). We then approximate the continuous distribution of this variable 
by a discrete set of values and their associated transition probabilities. We took the number of 
states to be equal to 10 as a compromise between maximization of accuracy in the approximation 
and minimization of time required by the numerical routine12. The ten states were distributed 
to capture 99% of the empirical unconditional distribution of (yt - Xt)/ Kt. Technical details are 
given in Appendix B. 
For the numerical analysis, we assume the following quadratic adjustment cost function 
(45) 
Notice that this adjustment cost function is monotonically increasing only for positive values of L 
Therefore, in order to obtain the equilibrium investment policies by the fixed point argument of 
Proposition 1, we require the minimum admissible i (g in [A.1] and [A.2]) to be zero. Furthermore, 
since the equilibrium investment-capital ratios are obtained as a fixed point of a monotonic 
operator, a natural choice for the starting values of the routine is io = O. Appendix C contains a 
description of the numerical routine. 
We set the technical and tax parameters as follows: C = 0.05, {3 = 0.96, cT = 0.1, 1.1 = 0.5, 
k = 0.1, and solved the model for several values of the relative risk aversion coefficient (I) 
and the adjustment cost parameter (1'])13. The application of a fixed point search routine yields 
the equilibrium distribution of the investment-capital ratios for each pair of 1 �d 1'] and the 
assumed technological and tax parameters. In order to be able to evaluate the performance 
IOGross Domestic Product in private industries, wages and inventories were obta.ined from DR!. Fixed private 
domestic capital comes from the Survey of Current BUJineu (1990) p. 3l. 
llWe find 
log(>'t) = -0.169415 + 0.911641 log(>'t_d 
(0.101) (0.054) 
where standard devia.tions are in parenthesis. fT. = 0.03346789, Ii? = 0.88 and DW = 1.9. 
I�Data simulated by using the estimated transition probability matrix indicated a high degree of accuracy of the 
a.pproximation. 
13We set the capita..! share parameter Q to match the estimated mean of 1 - Xt/Yi. The depreciation rate 
is approximately equa..! to the implicit depreciation rate obtained from regressing the capita..! stock series from 
Deportment of Commerce (1987) on itself lagged one period and the corresponding investment series. 
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of our calibration exercise, we also calculated some moments of the investment-capital ratios 
obtained from the data. Those statistics are given in �ble 1. 
Mean 
0.0863 0.0103 0.4389 
min max 
0.0615 0.1102 
Table 1: Statistics of actual it 
In Table 3 we present the equilibrium investment-capital ratios associated with the mean, 
minimum and maximum value of the productivity shock (>'t) for each pair (-y, '1). Similarly, in 
Table 4 we report the standard deviation of il. Notice that for sensible levels of risk aversion and 
adjustment costs it is possible to replicate the empirical mean value of the investment-capital 
ratio. Table 3 suggests that a value of i between 0.7 and 0.9 can be considered as consistent. 
with the data on investment and capital provided the adjustment cost parameter "1 is equal to 
15. Smaller ,'s would be acceptable for "1 between 25 and 35. 
As Table 2 documents, the investment-ca.pital ratio associated with a value for "y of 0.7 and 
values for f1 between 15 and 35 implies before tax adjustment costs of investment in a range 
between 5% and 10% of the total investment expenses when evaluated at the observed mean of 
the investment-capital ratio. This magnitude is below the ones found in many econometric esti-
mations [e.g., Hayashi (1982), Salinger and Summers (1983) and, more recently, Scha.ller (1990)). 
However, there is a general consensus that the estimations in those studies imply implausibly 
large losses of GNP. 
Less satisfactory is the ability of our model to match the standard devia.tion of the observed 
da.ta for reasonable parameter values. The model generates investment-capital ratios which are 
systematically less vola.tile than the observed data.. This fact comes from the relative smoothness 
i,lq 15 25 35 
0.07 3.7 4.9 6.1 
0.08 4.8 6.4 8.0 
0.09 6.1 8.1 10.1 
0.10 7.5 10.0 12.5 
0.11 9.1 12.1 15.1 
Table 2: Adjustment costs in percent: 100 · ('1/2) . i� 
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of the marginal productivity in relation to the investment series. As a consequence, our la-state 
Markov process is able to collect only 85% of the observed rates of growth of capital. in the last 40 
years instead of the theoretical 99%. However 100% of the investment-capital ratios empirically 
observed in the last 10 years are within the minimum and maximum of the model's equilibrium 
values for those combinations of f1 and i that best fit the mean value. 
Table 5 shows that the equilibrium investment--capital ratio (it), and therefore the growth 
rate of the economy (it - 6), is negatively related to the parameter i. This effect is due to both 
the riskiness of the real investment a.hd the agent's unwillingness to save large amounts when 
his elasticity of intertemporai substitution (1/;) is 10wl4• Notice that small changes in 'Y cause 
Significant changes in the growth rate of the economy. For instance when f1 = 25 the mean of 
the equilibrium stationary distribution of the growth rate of capital goes from 4.9% if 'Y = 0.5 to 
2.2% if 7 = 1.3. 
The adjustment cost parameter also affects negatively the equilibrium investment-capital ra-
tios. Confirming the analysis made in section 2 for the simple deterministic model with linear 
adjustment costs, the magnitude of the negative effect of the adjustment costs is positively related 
to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1/;). Changing the adjustment cost parameter (f1) 
from 15 to 35 implies changes in the expected equilibrium growth rates that range from 2 points 
if 'Y = 0.5 to 0.7 points15 if i = 1.3. Thus, by modifying the relative price of investment with 
respect to consumption, the presence of adjustment costs of investment constitutes an important 
element in the determination of the rate of growth of the e<:onomy. 
6 Tax Incidence Analysis 
The general equilibrium model presented in this paper provides a general framework in which 
one can analyze tax effects. In the previous section we saw that the model predicts equilibrium 
investment-capital ratios which imply positive growth rates for the economy. Therefore, the value 
14The equivalence of the coefficient of risk avemon a..Dd the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal lubstilution 
for the assumed preference structure mues it impossible to distinguisb between those two effect.. However, work 
with a generalized preference IJttucture 5UggeJts that unlike the portfolio choice, the consumption-uving decision 
is mainly characterized by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for empirica.lly sensible specifications of asset 
returns. (Sec Essa.y 1.) 
U According to Table 2 this cba.nge implies cha.nges in the relative size of the adjustment costs over the total 
before-tax investment expenses of 6 point. if i = 0.5 a.nd lA pointl if i = 1.3. 
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of the firm, welfare and taxes are non-stationary varia.bles. However, we have seen in Section 3 
that the ratio of those variables with respect to capital (or a power of capital) is stationary in 
equilibrium. Thus, we can distinguish between static effects characterized by the change in the 
normalized variables and dynamic effect
,
S produced by the variations in the growth rate of the 
economy. 
In Ta.ble 5 we present the expected equilibrium values for the investment capital ra.tio (i), 
value per capital (Vj K), normalized welfare (WI K1-"T) and government revenue per unit of 
capital (TjK) associated with the base case. TjK is computed by evaluating tax revenues at the 
equilibrium investment-capital ratios 
6.1 Change in the Corporate Tax Rate 
r = 1 , · " , m. (46) 
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of the equilibrium values of the variables with respect to 
changes in the corporate tax rate, we obtained the equilibrium investment-capital ratios keeping 
all parameten; as before but decreasing u from 0.5 to 0.4. 
The results of a ten point decrease in the corporate tax rate (reported in Tables 6 and 7) show 
a moderate increase of the equilibrium investment-capital ratio in a range between 3.5% and 
6.5%. Therefore, the effect of the tax-change on the after tax-marginal productivity of capital 
is slightly stronger than the effect of the increase in the after tax value of the adjustment costs 
on investment. The change is proportionally higher with low risk aversion and higher values of 
the adjustment cost parameter (17). Overall, the results imply an increase of the expected rate of 
growth of the economy of about one half of a percentage point. 
The value of the firm per unit of capital increases also moderately. However, in this case, the 
relative change is larger for low risk aversion and high adjustment costs. The estimated mean 
effect is now more sensitive to the size of 17 and i and ranges from 2.3% to 7.2%. 
We saw in Section 4 that changes in the investment-capital ratio affect both the rate of growth 
I 
of the value of the firm and the equilibrium value of the market value per unit of capital. Neither 
effect is considered in the traditional neoclassical Q models. Since the expected rate of growth of 
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the economy increases by approximately 0.5 points, this is exactly the expected increase in the 
rate of growth of the market valuation of the firm produced by the change in the tax code. Yet, 
as Table 7 shows, keeping the investment-capital ratio at its initial level, the effect of the change 
in the corporate tax rate on value per unit of capital is about 50% smaller than the one obtained 
taking account of changes in the optimal investment policies. This constitutes a measure of the 
underestimation of the long-run incidence of changes in u on the market value of the firms per 
unit of capital under the standard neoclassical Q-models. 
Finally, we study the effect of a decrease in u on total tax revenues. The effect on government's 
revenue is substantial, but relatively homogeneous, across values of risk aversion and adjustment 
cost parameters. The expected tax revenues per unit of capital decreases between 21% and 23%. 
Since tax revenue normalized by capital is a stationary variable in equilibrium, this variable 
grows over time at the same expected rate as capital. One can wonder how much time the 
new economy needs to catch up with the path of government revenues associated with the old 
economy characterized by larger taxes but smaller growth (Laffer effect). According to Table 7 
and Figure 5, the Laffer effect is only perceivable after a period not smaller than 39 years for the 
10 point decrease in the corporate tax rate. This striking result is due to both the important loss 
of revenues per unit of capital, and the moderate impulse in the economy produced by the tax 
change. 
6.2 Change in the Investment Tax Credit 
In Tables 8 and 9 we report the value, and percentage changes of the different variables as the 
tax parameter k decreases from 0.1 to O. 
As'expected, we observe a decrease in the equilibrium investment-capital ratios. The effect is 
important in relative terms, and is nega.tively related to both the adjustment cost parameter (TJ) 
and the relative risk aversion (;). The relative change in investment-capital ratios varies widely 
with the choice of parameters in a range betwee!l 8.5% and 15.9%_ Thus, .. the implied effect on 
the expected rate of growth of the economy is between 0.6 and 1.7 points. In absolute terms, for 
the cases closest to the empirically observed investment-capital ratio, the depressing effect on the 
ra.te of growth of capital implies slightly over a 1 point reduction in the economy's growth rate. 
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(For the (; = .7, ,, = 25) case, the economy's average growth rate changes from 3.7% to 2.6%.) 
The changes in value per unit of capital display the effects we described in Section 4. A 
decrease in the investment tax credit increases the market value per unit of existing capital due 
to the increase in the relative price of installed capital. However. since the equilibrium investment· 
capital ratio decreases as a consequence of the elimination of the tax incentive, according to (35), 
the initial positive change of value is partially offset by this endogenous growth effect. Thus, 
�.he net expected percentage change in value per unit of capital varies from 2.9% to 8.3%. Table 
7 shows the mean percentage effect on value we would have obtained without considering the 
offsetting endogenous growth effect. This ranges from 8.9% to 10.3%. That data implies that the 
standard Q·model would have overestimated the absolute effect of the change of the investment 
tax credit on the market value of the firm per unit of capital by a magnitude between 17% and 
73%. 
The dynamic effect on value of changes in the investment tax credit is also very striking. In 
a standard analysis with neoclassical Q models, the long run situation is characterized by the 
steady state corresponding to the new tax code. After a decrease in k, the new steady state 
unambiguously implies higher levels of the market value per unit of capital. The only way to 
interpret this result in the neoclassical fra.mework is that the tax change permanently depresses 
the steady state level of both the capital stock of the economy and the market value of the 
firms. In our model, the change in the market value per unit of capital does not require that 
unattractive interpretation and is compatible with positive growth in both value and capital. 
Thus, the elimination of the investment tax credit immediately increases the market valuation of 
the already installed capital. However, the long·run effect on value is negative as long as the tax 
change reduces the growth rate of that variable. As Table 9 shows, the mean path of the value 
of the firm intersects the one associated with the new tax code after a period of 4 to 14 years, 
depending on the values of I and fl. In order to illustrate this effect graphically we present in 
Figure 2 the mean, min and max path of the value of the firm before and after the tax: reform 
for the empirically relevant case of 1 = 0.7 and 71 = 25. The expanding effect of the elimination 
of the investment tax credit on value lasts from 6.'5 to 7.5 years with a probability of 99%. Thus, 
the elimination of the investment tax credit will negatively affect the market valuation of the firm 
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in the long-run by reducing its expected growth rate. This negative long-run effect on value is 
also obtained in the neoclassical models, but only associated with a decrease in the level of the 
capital stock of the economy. 
A similar exercise can be done with the changes in total tax revenues. In Table 9 we find that 
the reduction in the investment tax credit creates an expected increase in tax revenues between 
6.3% and 11.4%. We also find that this expanding effect lasts only between 7.5 and 11.6 years 
due to the reduced rate of growth of the economy and the moderate initial increase in governmen! 
revenues. In Figure 6, we show for the CI,']) = (0.7, 25) case the expanding effect lasts between 
8.4 and 8.5 years with a probability of 99%. 
Therefore, compa.red to the endogenous growth approach, the analysis of changes in the 
investment tax credit under exogenous growth models implies a substantial overvaluation of the 
effects on the market value of the firm per unit of capital and a much less empirically sensible 
interpretation of the long-run effects on the market value of the firm and total tax revenues. 
6.3 Comparison of Tax Instruments 
We have demonstrated the effects on growth, market value of the firm and total tax revenue of 
changes in u and k that imitated the ones of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Since the utility function 
chosen has only private consumption as an argument, welfare analysis of different tax reforms will 
always be biased against a reform that increases the fiscal burden. This problem is eliminated in 
the following exercise where we set tax parameters in such a way that tax revenues remain the 
same. 
In order to compare in a more homogeneous way the distorting effects of both tax instruments, 
we recalculate the equilibrium value of the variables for the case where the corporate tax rate is 
set to match Tj K obtained from decreasing k from 0.1 to O. Since under both tax reforms we will 
be subtracting the same amount of resources from the private sector, we can make comparisons 
in terms not only of value or growth, but also of welfa.re16. 
First, comparison of Table 5 with Tables 8 and 10 shows that the increase in the corporate 
tax rate provokes less slow-down of the economy than the reduction in the investment tax credit. 
"Notice, however, that tota.! tax revenue!! are only equal as a percentage of the economy's output (or capital 
stock). 
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The difference is of the order of 1 percentage point. Second, the effect on market value per unit 
of capital is dramatically different. While the decrease in the investment tax credit increases the 
value of the firm for up to 8 years, the increase of the corporate tax rate reduces it permanently. 
However, as a consequence of the different effects on the equilibrium expected growth rates of 
the economy, in the long run, the change in k would be more negative for the market value of 
the firm. Finally, the welfare loss of the reduction of the investment tax credit is, in general, 
significantly higher than the welfare effect of an increase in the corporate tax rate. The total 
magnitude of this difference is however very sensitive to the value of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, being almost negligible for I sufficiently close to 1. 
Those results suggest that the investment tax credit is a much more powerful instrument than 
the corporate tax rate for providing an incentive to invest. This incentive has positive short­
term effects on welfare and long-term effects on the market value of the firms that are stronger 
than the 'ones associated with an increase in the corporate tax rate. Conversely, an increase in 
the corporate tax rate has a lower impact on the economy's growth rate than a reduction in the 
investment tax credit and provides a higher increase in government revenueS. Thus, the corporate 
tax has less distorting effects on the economy and is a more powerful tool for raising funds from 
the pri vate sector. 
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7 Conclusions 
In this paper, we present a stochastic endogenous growth model with adjustment costs. We show 
that the inclusion of adjustment costs in a. stochastic framework constitutes a relevant general-
ization of the existing endogenous growth models for, at least, two reasons. First, the presence 
of small adjustment costs is empirically relevant for explaining the growth rate of the economy. 
Second, it allows us to relate growth to asset prices in a general equilibrium endogenous growth 
generalization of the Q-theory of investment. In particular, it is possible to obtain substantial 
asset pricing implications from the analysis of growth incentives in market economies. The model 
is used to analyze the incidence of taxes in the economy from a double perspective. On one side, 
we evaluate the role of adjustment costs in analyzing tax effects on growth. On the other side, 
we investigate how asset prices respond, in the long-run, to changes in taxes when the optimal 
investment policy is endogenously determined. 
The results show that moderate to small adjustment costs play a role in the determination 
of the growth rate of the economies comparable to the role played by attitudes toward intertem­
poral substitution. Moreover. adjustment costs constitute a force that moderates and eventua.lly 
reverses the effects of traditional investment incentive policies. In the text, we considered two 
policy instruments: the corporate tax and the investment tax credit. A change in those fiscal 
instruments that necessarily has a positive effect on the profitability of investment in an economy 
without adjustment costs increases the magnitude of the effectiv� adjustment costs, offsetting the 
\ 
expanding effect on growth. This effet.:t is produced either by a decrease in the tax-deductibility 
of adjustment costs or by the reduction in the value of installed capital in terms of non-installed 
capital. Empirical simulations show that the magnitude of the offsetting effect is significant and 
positively related to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 
The theoretical and numerical analysis of tax-incidence on the market price of the firm un­
derlies the important role played by the endogeneity of the growth ra.te in dealing with long-run 
effects on market value. The responsiveness of the optimal investment policies to changes in tax-
ation provokes two effects. On one side it modifies the equilibrium level of the market value per 
unit of capital. This effect significantly increases the effect of the corporate tax ra.te on the mar­
ket value and reduces the influence of the investment tax credit. Due to this effed, the standard 
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neoclassica.I models prod uce an underestimation of the effects of changes in the corporate tax rate 
and a severe overestimation of the effetts of changes in the investment tax-credit compared to the 
endogenous growth approach. On the other side, unlike in the neoclassical Q-models, the change 
in the optimal investment policy produced by the changes in taxation alters the growth rate of 
the market price of the firms. Therefore, by ignoring the endogeneity of the economy's growth 
rate, the standard neoclassical long-run policy analysis produces an inaccurate evaluation of the 
effects of changes in taxation on the market value of the firms and a misleading description of 
the dynamic long-run effects of the tax-policy. 
- 35 -
APPENDIX A 
Proof of Proposition 1 
First, define B(>.,i) ;:; (1 - u)>./a + u6T - (1 - k+ i)(i))i. Since B is strictly decreasing in i for 
each >., there exists a function i(>.) = b[B(i(.X),>.),AJ implicitly defined. 
Define the family of intervals S,. = (g,b(O,>',.)] for r = 1, · · · , m. Notice that H(Ar,iT) is 
continuous and monotonically increasing in ir for a given >.,. and i,. E Sr. Therefore, we can 
define a function i(�,) = M[H(�" i('\,)) • .\, J. 
Now consider the set S = 51 X 52 X . . . X 5m and the operator T on S where 
(47) 
It may be seen immedia.tely tha.t there exists a. solution to (23) if and only if T has a. fixed point 
in S. By Brouwer's theorem it suffices to show tha.t T ma.ps S onto itself, a.nd tha.t S is closed, 
bounded a.nd convex. 
Notice tha.t T is increasing in S by [A.I] and [A.2j and that Tg � 9 by [A.2j. T is also bounded 
from a.bove by Tb(O, >.). Therefore, T maps S onto itself. Finally, since the cartesian product 
of closed, bounded and convex sets is also closed, bounded and convex, S satisfies trivia.1ly tha.t 
condition. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
To simplify notation let i == i(>'t+t} and let Q(i) = 1 - k + �I(i)i + t(i) so that 
Ri("<+ll - {FK(a,+l)(I - u) + u6T + 'I>'(i)i' + (1 - 6)Q(il} /Q(i,l (48) 
{FK(a'+l)(1 - U)K'+1 - ( 1 - k + 'I>(i))iK'+1 + u6T + 
(1 - k + 'I>(i))iK'+l + 'I>'(i)i'K'+1 + (1 - 6)Q(i))K'+I} / [Q(i,)K'+IJ . (49) 
where equality (48) is definitional. Equation (49) follows from the addition and subtraction of 
( 1 - k+ �(i))i in the numera.tor and subsequent multiplication of the numerator and denominator 
of (48) by Kt+l' Now, note in the denomina.tor of (49) that Vi = Q( it)Kt+I from equation (34)). 
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Similarly, the first three terms in the numerator verify in equilibrium 
FK(a,+.)(I - .)K'+1 - [(1 - k + �(i))i + .6T)K1+. = 
= [>'01+1 (1 - u) - ( 1 - k + �(i))i + u6TJ KHI = D01+1 .  
Finally, the last three terms verify 
and, therefore, 
Q.E.D. 
(1 - k + �(i))iK'+1 + �'(i)i'K,+. + (1 - 6)Q(i)K,+. 
= [1 - k + �(i) + �'(i)i)iK,+. + (1 - 6)Q(i)K1+' 
= Q(i)iK'+1 + (1 - 6)Q(i)K1+' 
= Q(i)[I'+1 + (1 - 6)K,+.) 
Proof of Proposition 3 
(50) 
(51) 
From the definition of contingent claim prices in (42). the value of the firm can be written as 
(52) 
where the sequence {Ct+.}�� satisfies the first order conditions of the consumer's maximization 
problem. Now, replace Xt by the equilibrium value of the marginal productivity of capital ((1 -
o)>'t/a), divide both members of (52) by Kt and rearrange terms to find 
W(A" K,) = m(A,)K,.-', (53) 
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where 
C; � �" [q(A,) + c(�,)J + E, {� (C�:. r ( K�:. t" (1 : a) �,+. } . 
Q.E.D. 
APPENDIX B 
Discrete Approximation of the Continuous Distribution of the Exogenous Technical 
Shock 
We essentially follow Tauchen (1986) to obtain a discrete homogenous Markov process for >.. 
Consider a random variable XI that follows the stochastic process 
X, == J,l + pXI_1 + £1 
£1 N(O,a;). 
By the assumption of normality it is easy to show that XI satisfies 
and 
(54) 
For numerical purposes it is possible to bound the range of XI by imposing the condition tha.t 
the grid of states has to contain XI with a probability of, say 1 - n. If cf is the ! percentile, 
then a simple computation of confidence intervals yields that 
Define the upper and lower bounds for X as GL == J,lx - cfax and au == J,lx + Cf(1x, It is then 
possible to construct a grid defining the various states of X. H we wish to have m states then 
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defining ( =  (au - aLl/em - 1), we get the m sta.tes from 
Sj = aL + ((j - 1) j = l,· · ·,m. (55) 
To introduce transition probabilities la.ter on, it is useful to define 
Tj (56) 
Notice that the conditional distribution of X follows from (54) and is given by 
(57) 
Now, define the transition probability matrix {ll}:.':'a=l where IT,., .. = Pr(Xt+1 = slXt = r) is 
the transition probability of going from state r to state 8. By using (55), (56) and (57) we can 
a.pproximate IT by setting 
if 8 = 1 
Pr(T._l ::; X, ::; T,ISr) if s = 2, · · · , m - !  (58) 
Pr(X, � T,_tlS.) if 8 = m. 
The unconditional probabilities are given by the solution to the system 1'. = E:."::l p.rllr,. for 
s = 1 . · · · . m. 
APPENDIX C 
Numerical Solution of the Equilibrium Investment Problem 
Using the assumed functional forms for the consumer's preferences, the adjustment cost function, 
and the production fu,nction we can write the Euler equation. (18) as 
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{ [(I - u)�./a + UOT - (I - k + (1 - U)N)i,]-. . _, n
" ,  f3 (I .)�,/a + .OT _ (I k + (I .)N)i, (1 - 0 + " )  . 
(1 - u)�, + .oT + �N+ (I - 0)[1 - k + (I - .)l'i�) } _ 
3 - 1, 1 - k + (1 - u)Ti� 
which has to hold for all states r = 1" . . , m. By regrouping a.ll variables which depend on s (or 
r) on the left (right) hand side, we obtain 
t, n,,{f3{ (i - .)�,/a + uoT -(I - k +  (1 - u)�i;)i, r' 
{(I - u)�, + uoT + (i - u)�i! + (1 - 0)(1 - k +  (1- .)32� i�)}} 
_ {(I - .)�,/a + uoT - (I - k + (1 - uHi,)i, }-' { ( )3� " ) - . 1 _ 6 + ir 1 - k + 1 - U 2"'1" . 
Equation (59) can be written as 
m 
L n" .G(�" i(�.)) = H(�" i(�,)) r = I , , ,  . , m. 
.=1 
(59) 
A functional fixed point in equation (59) can then be seen as the solution of a. system of non-linear 
equations. The numerically most trouble free method (see Press et aI. (1988») for solving (59) is 
to use an iterative minimum distance algorithm. Therefore, we solve the problem 
where 
m 
a(i(,\,.)) = Ln" {G(i(�,))} - H(i(,\,.)) r ;;: l , · · · , m  . 
• =1 
To perform the minimization we use the Optmum procedure of the Ga.uss matrix language. Ac­
curacy is set to 10-6 and on average computations took 8.66 seconds 17. Gradients are computed 
numerically by using a.vaila.ble Ga.uss subroutines. 
Itperlormed on I. 386/33Mhz IBM·PC clone. 
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APPENDIX D 
Numerical Computation of the Indirect Utility Function 
Numerical computa.tions of the welfare function involve estimation of an infinite sum of expected 
future consumptions. In this section we consider technical aspects of how such evaluations can 
be performed. 
First recall that we have to compute the following expression 
(60) 
Define c, == (Gil K.P-'"1/(l - ')') as well as "". == fJ(K'+1/ K,)l-"Y = fJ (1 - 6 + i.)l-"1 and notice 
that (60) can be rewritten as 
(61) 
where we have interchanged expectations and summations. This normalization is useful because 
we know that e,l K, and KHt! K, are stationary variables depending only on the investment-
capital ra.tio (i,), The la.tter satisfies, in equilibrium, a. one-to-one relation with the stochastic 
ma.rginal productivity of capital. Taking expedations conditioned on one variable or the other is 
equivalent. 
Even though each summand of (61) involves a complicated product of future realiza.tions of 
the random variable i,. each one can be computed by recalling the definition of a multivariate 
conditional expectation and the properties of a. Markov chain. More precisely, we have 
.-1 
h(>.t,.s) == Et{ c, II Kr} = .&{ C,K,_1",_2 . • .  Kt+lKt } 
r=1 
= L: . . .  L: C(.I.)K(.I._t l ·  . .  K(.I'+l)K(.I,)Pr [i. = i(.I.). '._1 = .(.1._1). 
�. �'+1 
V.s > t , .  (62) 
Since the underlying process (>',) is markovian, one can show (See Shiryayev (1984), page 109-
- 4 1 -
110) that 
PrCi ... =:: i(>. .. ). i._l = i(A,_l), · · · .  it+l, = i(A/+1) ! it) 
� Pr(i. � i(A,)li,_. � i(A._d) · · · Pr(it+. � i(Al+d I i,), (63) 
so that the sum in (62) can be broken into products by using (63). Reordering summations we 
eventually get 
h(A"s) � 
L . . .  (L (Lc(A,)Pr(i. � i(A,)Ii._. � i(A,_.)))Pr(i,_. � i(A._dli,_2 � i(A._2))) 
).'+1 ).._1 ).. 
· · · Pr(it+. � i(AI+.)li,). 
Such an expression can be computed recursively by starting with the innermost term 18. From 
the time homogeneity property of the Markov chain, h(At+tl S + 1) = h(AI,s). This implies 
.(,1" s + I) � L h(A,+" s + I)Pr(A,.,IA,)K,. (64) 
).,+1 
Expression (64) is numerically well beha.ved and converges steadily. Any arbitrary degree of 
accuracy in the calculation of WI K can be achieved by recursively computing a sufficiently large 
number of terms using (64). 
18In a matrix language like Ga.uss or SAS-iML the evaluation of l: ...  c.Pr(i. = i()".)li,_1 = i(.\._t)) is tanta.­
mount to a. multiplication of a. (transition) matrix TI and a vector of consumption to capital ratios c: TIc. 
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11� 15 25 35 
0.110 0.099 0.090 
0.5 0.093 0.085 0.079 
0.128 0.113 0.103 
0.094 0.087 0.081 
0.7 0.078 0.073 0.069 
0.112 0.101 0.094 
0.086 0.080 0.076 
0.9 0.070 0.066 0.064 
0.103 0.094 0.088 
0.080 0.075 0.072 
1.1 0.065 0.062 0.060 
0.096 0.090 0.085 
0.076 0.072 0.069 
1.3 0.061 0.059 0.057 
0.092 0.086 0.082 
Table 3: Expectation (in boldface), minimum and maximum values of i (in the 99% confidence 
interval) for different adjustment costs ('1) and djfferent coefficients of risk aversion (-y). Other 
parameters: u = 0.5, k = 0.1, Ii = 0.05, /iT = 0.1. 
11� 15 25 35 
0.5 0.0077 0.0062 0.0053 
0.7 0.0073 0.0061 0.0054 
0.9 0.0070 0.0060 0.0054 
1.1 0.0068 0.0060 0.0054 
1.3 0.0067 0.0059 0.0054 
Table 4: Standard devia.tion of i for given pairs of 1] and '" Parameters are the same as in Table 
3. 
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� 1 i, V/K W/K'-' T/K 
0_5 0.110 1.100 62.13 0.114 
0.7 0.094 1.046 67.81 0.118 
15 0.9 0.086 1.018 225.90 0.119 
1.1 0.080 1.001 -281.22 0.120 
1.3 0.076 0.990 -122.21 0.121 
0.5 0.099 1.136 43.75 0.114 
0.7 0.087 1.081 63.68 0.117 
25 0.9 0.080 1.051 223.31 0.119 
1.1 0.075 1.033 -283.40 0.120 
1.3 0.072 1.020 -124.32 0.121 
0.5 0.090 1.161 36.38 0.115 
0.7 0.081 1.107 60.93 0.117 
35 0.9 0.076 1.078 221.35 0.119 
1.1 0.072 1.059 -285.16 0.120 
1.3 0.069 1.046 -126.10 0.120 
Table 5: Expecta.tions of investment, value, welfare and taxes in terms of capital for various pairs 
of 11 and I when the corporate tax rate (u) is set to 0.5 and the investment tax credit (k) is set 
to 0.1. 
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q 7 " V/K W/K'-' T/K 
0.5 0.117 1.161 94.18 0.088 
0.7 0.100 1.086 74.45 0.091 
15 0.9 0.090 1.050 231.32 0.093 
1 . 1  0.083 1.028 -275.48 0.094 
1.3 0.079 1.013 -115.44 0.095 
0.5 0.105 1.211 56.08 0.088 
0.7 0.091 1.134 · 69.10 0.091 
25 0.9 0.084 1.094 228.29 0.093 
1.1 0.078 1.069 -277.87 0.094 
1.3 0.075 1.052 -117.66 0.095 
0.5 0.096 1.244 43.96 0.088 
0.7 0.085 1.169 65.65 0.091 
35 0.9 0.079 1.129 226.04 0.093 
1.1 0.075 1.103 -279.79 0.094 
1.3 0.072 1.085 -119.52 0.094 
Table 6: Expectations of investment, value, welfare and taxes in terms of capital for various pairs 
of '1 and. 7 when the corporate tax rote (1£) is 0.4 and the investment tax cre<lit (k) remains a.t 
0.1. 
q 7 " V/K W/K -, T/K tv/K tVIK tWIK tTIK 
0.5 6.55 5.53 51.59 -23.32 2.65 N-C N-C 39.1 
0.7 5.40 3.88 9.80 -22.42 2.02 N-C N-C 52.1 
15 0.9 4.76 3.10 2.40 -22.02 1.69 N-C N-C 63.3 
1.1 4.30 2.63 2.04 -21.79 1 .49 N-C N-C 73.9 
1.3 3.93 2.31 5.53 -21.64 1.35 N-C N-C 84.1 
0.5 6.14 6.59 28.19 -23.10 3.39 N-C N-C 45.6 
0.7 5.07 4.89 8.52 -22.32 2.73 N-C N-C 59.5 
25 0.9 4.47 4.04 2.23 -21.96 2.37 N-C N-C 71.6 
1.1 4.03 3.50 1.95 -21.74 2.13 N-C N-C 82.9 
1.3 3.69 3.14 5.35 -21.60 1.97 N-C N-C 93.7 
0.5 5.85 7.21 20.86 -22.89 3.86 N-C N-C 51.3 
0.7 4.85 5.58 7.74 -22.22 3.24 N-C N-C 65.9 
35 0.9 4.27 4.72 2.12 -21.90 2.87 N-C N-C 78.6 
1 . 1  3.85 4.17 1.88 -21. 70 2.63 N-C N-C 90.6 
1.3 3.52 3.78 5.22 -21.57 2.46 N-C N-C 102.0 
Table 7: Percenta.ge cbanges of expecta.tions of economic variables for various pairs of 'I] and 'Y 
when the corporate tax rate decreases from u ;::; 0.5 to u :;. 0.4, (k remaining at 0.1). tV/ K is the 
percentage change in V / K keeping 1/ K constant. The last 3 columns indicate after how many 
years both tax codes yield the same level of a given variable. If the change is such that levels do 
not cross this is indicated by N-C. 
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� , i, V/K W/K'-o T/K 
0.5 0.093 1.144 37.40 0.127 
0.7 0.082 1.110 60.53 0.128 
15 0.9 0.075 1.092 220.49 0.129 
1.1 0.071 1.080 -286.41 0.129 
1.3 0.068 1.072 -127.80 0.129 
0.5 0.084 1.174 32.03 0.126 
0.7 0.076 1.139 58.16 0.127 
25 0.9 0.071 1.119 218.72 0.128 
1.1 0.068 1.107 -288.05 0.128 
1.3 0.066 1.098 -129.49 0.128 
0.5 0.Q78 1.194 29.03 0.126 
0.7 0.072 1.161 56.46 0.127 
35 0.9 0.068 1.142 217.31 0.127 
1.1 0.065 1.129 -289.42 0.128 
1.3 0.063 1.121 -130.94 0.128 
Table 8: Expectations of investment, value, welfare and taxes in terms of capital for various pairs 
of 11 and i when the corporate tax rate (u) is set to 0.5 and the investment tax credit (k) is 0.0. 
� , i, V/K WjK1-'"I T/K jV/K tVIK tWIK tTIK 
0.5 -15.86 4.05 -39.80 11.44 9.64 3.4 N-C 7.5 
0.7 -13.50 6.15 -10.74 8.99 9.99 5.9 N-C 8.0 
15 0.9 -12.00 7.20 -2.39 7.81 10.17 8.0 N-C 8.5 
1 . 1  -10.85 7.85 -1.84 7.11 10.28 9.9 N-C 9.1 
1.3 -9.92 8.30 -4.58 6.63 10.36 11.8 N-C 9.7 
0.5 -14.45 3.28 -26.78 10.62 9.23 3.4 N-C 8.4 
0.7 -12.34 5.35 -8.67 8.54 9.59 6.0 N-C 8.9 
25 0.9 -10.98 6.44 -2.06 7.52 9.80 8.3 N-C 9.5 
1.1 -9.94 7.14 -1 .64 6.89 9.93 10.4 N-C 10.1 
1.3 -9.09 7.63 -4.16 6.46 10.02 12.4 N-C 10.7 
0.5 -13.45 2.92 -20.20 9.88 8.96 3.4 N-C 9.0 
0.7 -11.52 4.86 -7.34 8.14 9.31 6.2 N-C 9.6 
35 0.9 -10.24 5.93 -1.83 7.25 9.51 8.6 N-C 10.2 
1.1 -9.27 6.64 -1.49 6.69 9.65 10.8 N-C 10.9 
1.3 -8.48 7.14 -3.84 6.30 9.74 13.0 N-C 11.6 
Table 9: Percentage changes of expectations of economic variables for various pairs of TJ and i 
when the investment tax credit decreases from k =0.1 to k =0.0, (tt remaining at 0.5). tV / K 
is the percentage change in VjK keeping 11K constant. The last 3 columns indicate after how 
many years both tax codes yield the same level of a given variable. If the change is such that 
levels do not cross this is indicated by N-C. 
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� � u ;, V/K W/K'--' T/K 
0.5 0.55 0.107 1.074 52.39 0.127 
0.7 0.54 0.092 1.031 65.25 0.128 
15 0.9 0.54 0.084 1.008 223.91 0.129 
1.1 0.53 0.079 0.993 ·283.25 0.129 
1.3 0.53 0.Q75 0.984 ·124.51 0.129 
0.5 0.55 0.096 1.106 39.32 0.126 
0.7 0.54 0.085 1.062 61.65 0.127 
25 0.9 0.53 0.079 1.038 221.54 0.128 
1.1 0.53 0.074 1.022 -285.29 0.128 
1.3 0.53 0.071 1.011 -126.53 0.128 
0.5 0.54 0.088 1.129 33.59 0.126 
0.7 0.54 0.080 1.087 59.23 0.127 
35 0.9 0.53 0.Q75 1.062 219.73 0.127 
1.1 0.53 0.071 1.046 -286.95 0.128 
1.3 0.53 0.068 1.035 -128.23 0.128 
Table 10: Column 3 represents the value of u when k = 0.1 whlch would have yielded the same 
tax income as when u = 0.5 and k = 0.0. The other columns present expecta.tions of investment, 
value, welfare and taxes in terms of capital for those t.I and k ;:: 0.1. 
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